Bidding for the surplus: A non-cooperative approach to the Shapley value by David Pérez-Castrillo & David Wettstein
Journal of Economic Theory 100, 274294 (2001)
Bidding for the Surplus:
A Non-cooperative Approach to the Shapley Value
1
David Pe  rez-Castrillo
Department Economia e Historia Economica and CODE, Universitat Auto  noma de Barcelona,
Edifici B, 08193 Bellaterra, Barcelona, Spain
David.Perezuab.es
and
David Wettstein
Department of Economics, Monaster Center for Economic Research,
Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Beer-Sheva 84105, Israel
wettstnbgumail.bgu.ac.il
Received December 22, 1999; final version received June 7, 2000;
published online March 8, 2001
We propose a simple mechanism to determine how the surplus generated by
cooperation is to be shared in zero-monotonic environments with transferable
utility. The mechanism consists of a bidding stage followed by a proposal stage. We
show that the subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of this mechanism coincide
with the vector of the Shapley value payoffs. We extend our results to implement
the weighted Shapley values. Finally, we generalize our mechanism to handle
arbitrary transferable utility environments. The modified mechanism generates an
efficient coalition structure, and implements the Shapley values of the super-
additive cover of the environment. Journal of Economic Literature Classification
Numbers: C71, C72.  2001 Academic Press
Key Words: Shapley value; implementation; simple mechanism; coalition forma-
tion.
1. INTRODUCTION
The Shapley value has long been a central solution concept in
cooperative game theory. It was introduced in Shapley [24] and was seen
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edged.as a reasonable way of distributing the gains of cooperation among the
players in the game. It is the most studied and widely used single-valued
solution concept in cooperative game theory. It has generated various
axiomatizations that demonstrate its fairness and consistency properties
(see, for instance, Myerson [19] and Hart and Mas-Colell [12]), and has
been used to impute costs and benefits as in cases of airport runways,
phone networks, and political situations.
2
A natural question concerning the Shapley value is whether the agents
can reach it through noncooperative behavior. In other words, is it possible
to find a noncooperative framework that gives rise to the Shapley value as
the result of equilibrium behavior? This is part of the Nash program, which
tries to provide a noncooperative foundation for cooperative solution con-
cepts. Several papers have addressed this question in different ways. We
will comment on them later in this Introduction.
In this paper, we provide a simple noncooperative game whose outcome
always coincides with the Shapley value for zero-monotonic games in
characteristic form. We call this game the bidding mechanism. The basic
idea of the bidding mechanism is quite simple. We let one of the players
make a proposal to each of the other players; a proposal that will either
be accepted by all the other players (in which case the proposal becomes
final) or be rejected. In the latter case, the proposer is now on his or her
own and the rest of the players play the same game again. If the proposal
is accepted, the proposer can form the grand coalition of all the players
and collect the value generated in exchange for the proposed payments to
the rest of the players.
The question of how the proposer is determined is, of course, central to
the design of the bidding mechanism. Indeed, in some games, being the
proposer could prove to be beneficial, while in other games it is preferable
not to be the proposer. Hence, before the proposal stage is reached, the
players will bid to become the proposer, where bids can be positive or
negative.
3 The player with the highest net bid (the difference between the
sum of the bids one player makes to the others minus the sum of the bids
the others make in return) becomes the proposer and, before proceeding to
the proposal stage, pays the bids to the other players. We will show that
in the subgame perfect equilibria (SPE) of the bidding mechanism a
proposer is determined who will make a proposal that will be accepted by
the others. For the proposer, the difference between the value of the grand
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2 For a nice introduction to the Shapley value and, in particular, its applications, see, for
example Roth [23].
3 Crawford [2] also made use of a bidding stage in a procedure to generate Pareto-efficient
egalitarian-equivalent allocations. The discrete time noncooperative coalitional bargaining
game proposed by Evans [6] to implement the core in subgame perfect equilibria also intro-
duced simple bidding by the players for the right to make an offer.coalition and the payments and bids paid is his or her Shapley value. For
each of the other players as well, the sum of the bid received plus the
accepted proposal is that player's Shapley value.
4
Several features of our game make it attractive and different from pre-
vious noncooperative approaches to the Shapley value. First, the players
obtain the Shapley value in every equilibrium outcome of the game; that is,
the implementation is not in expected terms. Also, the game does not imply
any a priori randomization that imposes some order on the moves of the
players. By adjusting their bids, all players can determine who will be the
proposer. Second, the rules of the game are very natural and do not rely
on random meetings or probabilities that are close to the actual definition
of the Shapley value. Hence, the implementation is less obvious and
provides further support for the use of the Shapley value. Third, the game
is finite. Moreover, at equilibrium, it ends in one stage if the game is strictly
zero-monotonic (a stage includes three periods of play: bidding, proposing,
and accepting or rejecting). Fourth, the strategies played by the players at
equilibrium are simple and intuitive. Furthermore, even though the Shapley
value plays no role in specifying the rules of the game, the equilibrium
strategies are intimately related to the Shapley value itself.
Implementing the Shapley value is not straightforward. For example,
Thomson [27] focused on the problems created by strategic behavior and
showed that an agent can obtain a better outcome by unilaterally mis-
representing his or her utility function. Several authors have attempted to
realize the Shapley value and overcome such problems.
Gul [7, 8] analyzed a transferable utility economy where random
meetings between two agents occur. At each meeting, a randomly chosen
party makes an offer to his or her partner. Acceptance of the offer means
that the proposer buys the partner's resources. If the offer is rejected, the
meeting dissolves and both agents stay in the market. For strictly convex
games, as the time interval between meetings becomes arbitrarily small, the
expected payoff of each player at an efficient stationary subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium (SSPE) converges to that player's Shapley value. If strict
convexity is replaced by strict superadditivity the convergence result holds
for those efficient SSPE that entail immediate agreement (Gul [7] and
Hart and Levy [11]).
Evans [5] showed that a simplified version of Gul's result follows from
the following characterization of the Shapley value. Consider a cooperative
game and an associated feasible payoff vector. Assume that players are ran-
domly split into two groups and a representative player is chosen also at
random from each group. These two players bargain with each other over
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4 The equilibrium strategies are unique if the game is strictly zero-monotonic. Otherwise,
there might be other equilibria in addition to this one, but they still yield the Shapley value.how to split the total resources available to all of the players. Following the
bargaining process each of the two players has to pay out of his or her
share to the members of his or her group according to the prespecified
payoff vector. This procedure yields an expected payoff to any player that
depends on the initial payoff vector, the random partition mechanism, and
the solution concept applied to two-person bargaining problems. The
initial payoff vector is called consistent if it equals the expected payoff vec-
tor. If all partitions are equally likely and the bargaining solution splits the
surplus equally, the Shapley payoff vector is the unique consistent payoff
vector.
Hart and Mas-Colell [13] proposed a different natural bargaining pro-
cedure that supports the Shapley value (as well as the Nash bargaining
solution for pure bargaining problems). In their paper, the proposers are
also chosen at random but the meetings are multilateral. Agreement
requires unanimity. Disagreement puts the proposer in jeopardy, since
there is a given probability that he may be removed from the game after
a rejection. As the probability of removal becomes small, the SSPE of the
procedure yield the Shapley value
5. When the probability of removal is
one, Hart and Mas-Colell [13] as well as Mas-Colell [18] showed that the
expected payoff of any player coincides with that player's Shapley value.
Their mechanism is then the same as our mechanism with the bidding stage
replaced by a random determination of the proposer. Krishna and Serrano
[15] showed further that for removal probabilities close to one there is a
unique SPE of the game proposed by Hart and Mas-Colell [13] that yields
the Shapley value payoff vector in expectation.
In a different spirit, Hart and Moore [14] proposed a game in which
agents are lined up and each agent makes an offer to the following agent,
where the offer is a contract that may specify what offer this agent has to
make to the next agent. This game implements the Shapley value in SPE.
Winter [28] and Dasgupta and Chiu [4] proposed demand commitment
games in which each player can either make a demand to the following
player or form a coalition satisfying the demands of some of the preceding
players. For strictly convex games, these mechanisms implement the
Shapley value in SPE
6. In these three works, the implementation is in
expected terms since in the first stage of the game the order of the players
(or the identity of the first player in Winter [28]) is randomly chosen, each
possible choice having the same probability.
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5 They also show that for NTU games, the limit of the SSPE (as the probability of removal
becomes small) is the consistent value, a solution concept that was introduced by Maschler
and Owen [16, 17].
6 Winter [28] also required either subgame consistency or strategic equilibria. Dasgupta
and Chiu [4] also developed an implementation for general games in characteristic form if
there is an (external) planner who is able to impose a system of transfers and taxes.A solution concept closely related to the Shapley value is the weighted
Shapley value (Shapley [25]). We also show that a very natural and
simple modification of the bidding mechanism implements the weighted
Shapley values.
7
Finally, we generalize the bidding mechanism to deal with all trans-
ferable utility environments. In the generalized bidding mechanism (GBM),
the proposer makes a proposal to each of the other players and,
simultaneously, chooses the coalition he or she wants to form. If all the
agents accept the proposal and the coalition, the coalition is formed and
the rest of the players proceed to play the same game among themselves
(after having received the proposed payment by the proposer). In the case
of rejection, the proposer is on his or her own and the remaining players
play the same game again. In any SPE of this mechanism, the proposer
makes a proposal that is accepted. The payoff of the proposer is the dif-
ference between the value of the coalition the proposer formed and the
payments and bids the proposer made. The payoff to any player in the
coalition is the sum of the bid and the proposal accepted. The payoff to
players outside the coalition is the sum of the bid, the proposal accepted,
and their payment in the continuation game. Hence, the SPE of this
mechanism determine a coalition structure and a sharing of the surplus
generated under this particular structure. We show that at the SPE of the
generalized bidding mechanism the players form an efficient coalition struc-
ture. Moreover, the final payments of the players coincide with the Shapley
values of the superadditive (SA) cover of the game.
8
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic
cooperative definitions and Section 3 introduces the bidding mechanism
and shows that it implements the Shapley value for zero-monotonic games.
In Section 4 we extend our results by implementing the set of weighted
Shapley values. In Section 5 we define the generalized bidding mechanism
and show that it implements the Shapley value of the superadditive cover
of the game. The paper concludes with a brief summary and discussion of
further research.
2. THE COOPERATIVE MODEL
Consider a cooperative game in characteristic form (N, v), where
N=[1, ..., n] is the set of players and v :2
NR is a characteristic function
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7 Hart and Mas-Colell [12] also extended their results to weighted Shapley values.
8 If the game is superadditive, the grand coalition is an efficient structure and the Shapley
value of the superadditive cover coincides with the Shapley value. Therefore, the final SPE
outcome of the generalized bidding mechanism is the same as the final SPE outcome of the
bidding mechanism.satisfying v(8)=0 where 8 is the empty set. For a coalition SN, v(S)
represents the total payoff that the partners in S can jointly obtain if this
coalition is formed. We say that the cooperative game (N, v)i s
zero-monotonic if v(S)+v([i])v(S_[i]) for any subset SN with i  S.
In a zero-monotonic game there are no negative externalities when a single
player joins a coalition. In Sections 2 to 4 of this paper, we restrict our
analysis to zero-monotonic games.
We denote by ,(N)#R
n the Shapley value of the cooperative game
(N, v) which is defined by
9
,i(N)= :
SN[i]
|S|!(n&|S|&1)!
n!
[v(S_[i])&v(S)] for all i# N,
where |S| denotes the cardinality of the subset S. The Shapley value can be
interpreted as the expected marginal contribution made by a player to the
value of a coalition, where the distribution of coalitions is such that any
ordering of the players is equally likely. Also, Shapley [24] characterized
the value as the only function that satisfies symmetry, efficiency, a null
player axiom, and additivity.
Given the cooperative game (N, v) and a subset SN, we define the
game (S, vS) by assigning the value vS(T)#v(T) to every TS. We write
(S, v) instead of (S, vS) for notational convenience. Similarly, ,(S)#R
|S|
denotes the Shapley value of the game (S, v).
3. THE BIDDING MECHANISM
In this section, we design a noncooperative game, which we call the
bidding mechanism. The equilibrium outcomes of this mechanism always
coincide with the Shapley value of the cooperative game (N, v) and thus
this mechanism implements the Shapley value in subgame perfect equilibria.
We propose a way to split the surplus of the cooperation that is based upon
the idea that only one of the players will make a proposal to each of the
other players. We invoke a notion of consistency in order to determine the
outcome of the game if the proposal is rejected. Following a rejection the
players other than the proposer play the same game again. Proceeding in
this way, the payoff of an agent is sensitive not only to whether or not that
agent is the proposer, but also to the precise identity of the proposer.
Hence, in order to provide each player with the same strategic possibilities,
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9 We use ,(N) instead of ,(N, v) for notational simplicity.each player can, by his or her bid, directly influence the choice of the
proposer. An intriguing feature of the mechanism is that the Shapley value
is not the outcome of just one decision, but rather it emerges as the
cumulative outcome of both the proposal and the bid.
The mechanism is defined recursively. If there is only one player, then
that player just obtains the value of his or her stand-alone coalition. It is
also useful to describe the bidding mechanism with only two players. It is
a three-stage game. First, each player makes a bid to the other. The
proposer is then chosen as the player making the highest bid. If the bids
are equal the proposer is chosen randomly. The proposer pays the
promised bid to his or her partner. In the second stage, the proposer makes
an offer to the other player to join him or her. In the final stage, the player
who is not the proposer either accepts or rejects the offer. If the player who
is not the proposer accepts, the grand coalition is formed and the proposer
collects the value generated by it while paying the offer to the other player.
If the proposal is rejected each player is left on his or her own and hence
each obtains the value of the stand-alone coalition (minus or plus the
bid paid previously). Once we know the rules of a two-player bidding
mechanism, we can define the mechanism for three players and so on.
Assuming that we know the rules of the bidding mechanism when played
by at most n&1 players, we now define the game for n players.
First, each of the players makes a bid to each of the other players. To
determine the identity of the proposer, we define the net bid of a player as
the difference between the sum of the bids a player makes to the others
minus the sum of the bids the others make to him or her. The net bid of
a player tries to measure the difference between the incentives of this player
to become the proposer (what he or she bids) and what the others are
ready to pay him or her for each of them to become the proposer (what
the others bid to that player). The player with the highest net bid is chosen
to be the proposer. If several players make the highest net bid, the proposer
is chosen randomly among them. Once named a proposer, the player
proceeds to pay the bids to the other players. Second, the proposer makes
an offer to each of the other players to join him or her. Finally, each of the
other players sequentially either accepts or rejects the offer.
10 The offer is
accepted, and all the players join in the grand coalition only if all of them
accept the offer. In this case, the proposer obtains the value of the coali-
tion, paying to the others the promised offers. If the offer is rejected, the
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10 Note that the actual sequence of players is inconsequential. The fact that players respond
in sequence rather than simultaneously is crucial for ruling out ``bad'' equilibria. In bad equi-
libria, there are several players rejecting the proposal since whenever there is at least one
rejection, a rejection by any other player is optimal (the proposal will be rejected independ-
ently of his or her decision).proposer is on his or her own, obtaining the value of his or her stand-alone
coalition (minus the bids he or she has already paid).
11 The rest of the
players keep their bids and play the same game with n&1 players.
It is important to notice that the element of randomness in the deter-
mination of the proposer is inconsequential to our proofs. Our results still
hold if ties in net bids are broken deterministically as would be the case if
the highest indexed player was chosen as the proposer. Randomness is
introduced only in order to prevent biased treatment of the participating
players. We will return to this issue in the conclusion, when we will discuss
possible extensions of our mechanism.
We now describe the bidding mechanism more formally. Suppose first
that there is only one player [i]. Then, this player obtains the value of the
stand-alone coalition (i.e., v(i)).
Suppose now that we know the rules of the bidding mechanism when
played by at most n&1 players. The bidding game for a set of players
N=[1, ..., n] proceeds as follows:
t=1: Each player i # N makes bids b
i
j in R for every j{i. Hence, at
this stage, a strategy for player i is a vector (b
i
j)j{i in R
n&1.
For each i # N, we let B
i= j{i b
i
j& j{i b
j
i . Let :=argmaxi(B
i) where,
in the case of a nonunique maximizer, : is randomly chosen among the
maximizing indices. Once chosen, player : pays b
:
i to every player i{:.
t=2: Player : makes an offer y
:
j in R to every player j{:. There-
fore, at this stage a strategy for player i is a vector (y
i
j)j{i in R
n&1 that he
or she will follow if chosen to be the proposer.
t=3: The players other than :, sequentially, either accept or reject
the offer. If a rejection is encountered, we say the offer is rejected.
Otherwise, we say the offer is accepted.
If the offer is rejected, all players other than : proceed to play the bidding
mechanism where the set of players is N"[:] and player : obtains the
value of his or her stand-alone coalition. On the other hand, if the offer is
accepted, each player i{: receives y
:
i and player : obtains the value of the
grand coalition minus the payments i{: y
:
i .
Given that the characteristic function is v(.), the final payment for player
: in case of rejection is v(:)&i{: b
:
i . Final payments for the other
players will be the sum of the bid b
:
i received and the outcome of the
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11 Our results hold for any specification of the outside value for the proposer as long as he
or she obtains a payment less or equal to the value of his or her stand-alone coalition. See
Section 7 in Hart and Mas-Colell [13] for an interpretation of a situation in which the
proposer would obtain zero if the offer is rejected and for further discussion on this extension.mechanism where the players are N"[:]. In case of acceptance of the
proposal, final payment to any player i other than : is given by y
:
i+ b
:
i ,
whereas player a obtains v(N)&i{: y
:
i &i{: b
:
i .
In order to analyze the outcome of the bidding mechanism, the following
well-known characterization of the Shapley value will be useful. The
Shapley value of a player i is the average of the marginal contribution of
this player to the grand coalition and his or her Shapley values in the
games where a player different from i has been removed. Or, more
formally,
,i(N)=
1
n
(v(N)&v(N"[i]))+
1
n
:
j{i
,i(N"[j] ).
This equation has been previously used by Maschler and Owen [16]
and Hart and Mas-Colell [12]. Furthermore, note that it provides a con-
venient recursive definition of the Shapley value. Defining %i([i])=v(i) for
every i, the previous equation characterizes the Shapley value for every
game (N, v).
Theorem 1. The bidding mechanism implements the Shapley value of the
zero-monotonic game (N, v) in SPE.
Proof. The proof proceeds by induction on the number of players n.
The theorem holds for k=1, since for a one-player game, the value of the
player's stand-alone coalition is the Shapley value.
We now assume that the theorem holds for k=n&1 and show that it
also holds for k=n. We take N=[1, ..., n]. We first prove that the Shapley
value payoff is indeed an equilibrium outcome. We explicitly construct an
SPE that yields the Shapley value as an SPE outcome. Consider the follow-
ing strategies:
At t=1, each player i, i # N, announces b
i
j=,j(N)&,j(N"[i]), for
every j{i.
At t=2, player i, i # N, if he or she is the proposer, offers
y
i
j=,j(N"[i]) to every j{i.
At t=3, player i, i # N, if player j{i is the proposer, accepts any offer
greater than or equal to ,i(N"[j]) and rejects any offer strictly smaller
than ,i(N"[j]).
It is clear that these strategies yield the Shapley value for any player who
is not the proposer, since x
:
i=b
:
i+y
:
i=,i(N), for i{:. Moreover, given
that following the strategies the grand coalition is formed, the proposer
also obtains his or her Shapley value.
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i are equal to zero. Following the above
mentioned strategies,
B
i= :
j{i
b
i
j& :
j{i
b
j
i= :
j{i
(,j(N)&,j(N"[i]))& :
j{i
(,i(N)&,i(N"[j])).
By the balanced contributions property (see Myerson [19])
,j(N)&,j(N"[i])=,i(N)&,i(N"[j])
and hence B
i=0.
To check that the previous strategies constitute an SPE, note first that
the strategies at t=2 and t=3 are best responses as long as v(N)&v(i)
j{i ,j(N"[i])=v(N"[i]). Indeed, in the case of rejection, a proposer i
obtains v(i) and the players j{i play the bidding mechanism where N"[i]
is the set of players; by the induction argument, the outcome of this game
is the Shapley value vector (,j(N"[i]))j{i. Consider now the strategies at
t=1. If player i increases his or her total bid j{i b
i
j , then that player will
be chosen as the proposer with certainty, but his or her payoff will
decrease. If that player decreases his or her total bid another player will
propose and player i's payoff would still equal his or her Shapley value.
Finally, any change in his or her bids that leaves the total bid constant will
influence the identity of the proposer but will not alter player i's payoff.
We now show that any SPE yields the Shapley value. We proceed by a
series of claims:
Claim (a). In any SPE, at t=3, all players other than the proposer :
accept the offer if y
:
i>,i(N"[:]) for every player i{:. Moreover, if
y
a
i<,i(N"[:]) for at least some i{:, then the offer is rejected.
Note that in the case of rejection, by the induction argument the payoff
to a player i{: is ,i(N"[:]). We denote the last player that has to decide
whether to accept or reject the offer, at t=3, by ;. If the game reaches
player ;, i.e., there has been no previous rejection, his or her optimal
strategy involves accepting any offer higher than ,;(N"[:]) and rejecting
any offer lower than ,;(N"[:]). The second to last player (denoted by
;&1) anticipates the reaction of player ;. Hence, if y
:
;&1>,;&1(N"[:])
and y
:
;>,;(N"[:]), and the game reaches player ;&1, player ; will
accept the offer. If y
:
;&1<,;&1(N"[:]) and y
:
;>,;(N"[:]), player ;
will reject the offer. If y
:
;<,;(N"[:]), player ;&1 is indifferent to accept-
ing or rejecting any offer y
:
;&1, since he or she knows that player ; is
bound to reject the offer should the game reach him or her. In any case,
the offer is rejected. We can go backward using the same argument to
prove claim (a).
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starts at t=2 is the following: At t=2, player : offers y
:
i= ,i(N"[:])t o
all i{:;a tt=3, every player i{: accepts any offer y
:
i,i(N"[:]) and
rejects the offer otherwise.
If v(N)=v(N"[:])+v(:) there exist SPE in addition to the previous
one. Any set of strategies where, at t=2, the proposer offers y
:
j
,j(N"[:]) to a particular player j{: and, at t=3, the player j rejects any
offer y
:
j,j(N"[:]), also constitutes an SPE.
In all the SPE of this subgame, the final payoffs to players : and i{:
are v(N)&v(N"[:])& j{: b
:
j and ,i(N"[:])+b
:
i, respectively.
It is easy to see that the proposed strategies constitute an SPE. Suppose
now that v(N)>v(N"[:])+v(:). In that case, rejection of the offers made
by player : cannot be part of an SPE. In such a case, player : receives v(:).
Player : can improve his or her payoff by offering ,i(N"[:])+=(n&1) to
every i{:, with =<v(N)&v(N"[:])&v(:) and =>0 so that these offers
are accepted (by (a)). Therefore, an SPE requires acceptance of the
proposal. This implies y
:
i,i(N"[:]) for all i{:. However, an offer such
that y
:
j>,j(N"[:]) for some j{: cannot be part of an SPE, since :
could still offer ,i(N"[:])+=(n&1) to every i{:, with =<y
:
j&
,j(N"[:]) and =>0. These offers are accepted and :'s payoff increases.
Hence, y
:
i=,i(N"[:]) for all i{: at any SPE. Finally, acceptance of the
proposals implies that, at t=3, every agent i{: accepts an offer if
y
:
i,i(N"[:]).
If v(N)=v(N"[:])+v(:), then the proposer has to offer at least
 j{: , j(N"[:])=v(N"[:]) for the offer to be accepted by every other
player. By the same argument as in the previous case, every equilibrium in
which the offer is accepted necessarily involves a proposal of exactly
,j(N"[:]) for every j{:. Given that the proposer obtains v(:) in case of
rejection, any offer that leads to a rejection would be an SPE as well.
Notice that following the first strategies, the offer is accepted and the
grand coalition is formed, while the second strategies imply that the
proposer is left on his or her own. Given that the last strategies are SPE
only when v(N)=v(N"[:])+v(:), it is easy to check that the final payoffs
are those stated in the claim.
Claim (c). In any SPE, B
i=B
j for all i and j and hence B
i=0 for all
i in N.
Denote 0=[i# N | B
i=Max j (B
j). If 0=N the claim is satisfied since
i # N B
i=0. Otherwise, we can show that any player i in 0 can change his
or her bids so as to decrease the sum of payments in case he or she wins.
Furthermore, these changes can be made without altering the set 0. Hence,
the player maintains the same probability of winning and obtains a higher
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strategy by announcing b
'i
k=b
i
k+$ for all k # 0 and k{i; b
'i
j=b
i
j&|0| $;
and b
'i
l=b
i
l for all l  0 and l{j. The new net bids are B
'i=B
i&$; B
'k=
B
k&$ for all k # 0 and k{i; B
'j=B
j+|0| $ and B
'l=B
l for all l  0 and
l{j.I f$ is small enough, so that B
j+|0| $<B
i&$ (remember that
B
j<B
i), then B
'l <B
'i=B
'k for all l  0 (including j) and for all k # 0.
Therefore, 0 does not change. However, h{i b
i
h&$<h{i b
i
h.
Claim (d). In any SPE, each player's payoff is the same regardless of
who is chosen as the proposer.
We already know that all the bids B
i are the same. If player i would
strictly prefer to be the proposer, he or she could improve his or her payoff
by slightly increasing one of his or her bids b
i
j . Similarly, if player i would
strictly prefer that some other player j was the proposer, he or she could
improve his or her payoff by decreasing b
i
j . The fact that player i does not
do so in equilibrium means that he or she is indifferent to the proposer's
identity.
Claim (e). In any SPE, the final payment received by each of the
players coincides with each player's Shapley value.
Note first that if player i is the proposer, his or her final payoff is given
by x
i
i=&(N)&&(N"[i])& j{i b
i
j . On the other hand, if player j{i is the
proposer, the final payoff of player i is given by x
j
i=,i(N"[j])+b
j
i .
Therefore, the sum of payoffs to player i over all possible choices of the
proposer is given by:
:
j
x
j
i=\
&(N)&&(N"[i])&:
j{i
b
i
j+
+ :
j{i
(,i(N"[j])+b
j
i)
=&(N)&&(N"[i]+ :
j{i
,i(N"[j])&B
i
=&(N)&&(N"[i])+ :
j{i
,i(N"[j])=n,i(N).
Moreover, since player i is indifferent to all possible choices of the
proposer, we have x
j
i=x
k
i for all j, k. Therefore x
j
i=,i(N) for all j in N.
Q.E.D.
The theorem, in addition to showing that the mechanism indeed realizes
the Shapley value, provides us with the explicit form of the equilibrium
strategies. The ease by which these strategies can be computed adds further
credibility to our results and helps in the actual implementation of the
mechanism. At equilibrium, the bid of player i to player j is , j(N)&
, j(N"[i]). The balanced contributions property (see Myerson [19])
285 NON-COOPERATIVE SHAPLEY VALUEimplies that the bid can also be expressed as ,i(N)&,i(N"[j] ), which is
the contribution of player j to the Shapley value of player i. In particular,
the bids are symmetric: player i bids for j just as much as player j bids for
i. Furthermore, the determination of the offers is also simple. If player i is
the proposer, he or she offers ,j(N"[i]) to any other player j. The offer
reflects the outside options of the players other than the proposer. Due to
the recursive nature of our mechanism, these options are given by their
Shapley value in the game without the proposer. Finally, notice that if the
game is strictly zero-monotonic
12 not only is the equilibrium outcome
unique, but the equilibrium strategies are unique as well. This eliminates
problems of coordination among the players.
As we pointed out in the informal description of the mechanism,
Theorem 1 holds if proposer : obtains a payment u(:) lower than v(:)i n
case his or her offer is rejected. This is a more reasonable assumption in
those circumstances in which the technology is not replicable. In such a
case v(S) represents the payoff to the partners in S only if they have access
to the technology. If u(i)< v(i) for every i in N, then the equilibrium
strategies are unique even if the game is zero-monotonic and not strictly
zero-monotonic.
A further advantage of the mechanism is that it is finite in contrast to the
infinite horizon mechanisms that implement the Shapley value in stationary
SPE. Moreover, at the proposed equilibrium strategies, only the first stage
of the game is played, with the proposal made by the chosen proposer
accepted by the other players.
We can modify our mechanism by replacing the bidding stage with a
random selection of the proposer. Once the proposer is determined, the
game proceeds similarly to our mechanism with the only difference being
that in case of rejection the new proposer is randomly selected from the
remaining players. This modified mechanism coincides with the Mas-Colell
[18] and Hart and Mas-Colell [13] (with removal probability equal to
one) construction. In this mechanism, however, the equilibrium payoffs
yield the Shapley value in expected terms only.
4. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WEIGHTED SHAPLEY VALUES
The weighted Shapley value emerges out of considering nonsymmetric
divisions of the surplus. It is defined in Shapley [25] by stipulating an
exogenously given system of weights w # R
n
++. Each unanimity game is
assigned a value by having agent i receive the share w
i j# N w
j of the unit.
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12 We say that a game is strictly zero-monotonic if v(S)+v([i])<v(S_[i]) for any subset
SN with i  S and S{8.The w-weighted Shapley value of a game is defined as the linear extension
of this operator to the game. We denote by ,wi(N) the w-weighted Shapley
value of player i in the cooperative game (N, v).
A convenient way to express the weighted Shapley value is through the
weighted potential function Pw(N) defined in Hart and Mas-Colell [12].
13
The w-weighted potential Pw(N) is the unique function from the set of
games into R that satisfies Pw(8)=0 and i #N w
iD
iPw(N)=&(N), where
D
iPw(N)=Pw(N)&Pw(N"[i]). This function satisfies: w
iD
iPw(N)=,wi(N).
Furthermore,
Pw(N)=
1
 j # N w
j_
&(N)+ :
j # N
w
jPw(N)"[j])&
.
The weighted Shapley value, as the Shapley value, can be calculated
using a recursive procedure. The role played by this formula in the proof
of Theorem 2 is similar to the role played by the recursive formula charac-
terizing the Shapley value in the proof of Theorem 1:
Lemma 1. The weighted Shapley value of player i satisfies the equality:
,wi(N)=
1
 j # N w
j_
w
i(v(N)&&(N"[i]))+ :
j{i
w
j,wi(N"[j])&
.
Proof. The weighted Shapley value of player i satisfies:
,wi(N)=w
i[Pw(N)&Pw(N"[i])]
=w
i 1
 j# N w
j_
v(N)+ :
j # N
w
jPw(N"[j])& :
j # N
w
jPw(N"[i])&
=
1
 j # N w
j_
w
iv(N)+ :
j{i
w
j(w
iPw(N"[j])&w
iPw(N"[i, j])
&w
iPw(N"[i])+w
iPw(N"[i, j]))&
=
1
 j # N w
j_
w
iv(N)+ :
j{i
w
j,wi(N"[j])&w
i :
j{i
,wj(N"[i])&
=
1
 j # N w
j_
w
iv(N)&v(N"[i]))& :
j{i
w
j,wi(N"[j])&
. Q.E.D.
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13 Again, we omit the constant v and write for short ,wi(N)o rPw(N) instead of ,wi(N, v)
or Pw(N, v).We will now indicate how to modify our original bidding mechanism in
order to obtain as an equilibrium outcome any weighted Shapley value.
The only difference is in the construction of the weighted net bids Bw
i. The
determination of net bids incorporates the vector of weights w# R
n
++ by
having Bw
i= j{i w
ib
i
j& j{i w
jb
j
i . Other than that change, the weighted
bidding mechanism proceeds like the bidding mechanism. Intuitively we
weigh each bid differently, according to the exogenously given weight of the
person making the bid.
Theorem 2. The weighted bidding mechanism implements the weighted
Shapley value of the zero-monotonic game (N, v) in SPE.
The proof of Theorem 2 is similar to the proof of Theorem 1.
Finally, note that we can implement the weighted Shapley value in
expected terms by using a simpler mechanism (similar to the Mas-Colell
[18] and Hart and Mas-Colell [13] construction for the Shapley value).
Given a system of weights w# R
n
++, we replace the bidding stage by a
random choice of the proposer, where the probability of player i to be
chosen as the proposer equals w
ij # N w
j (rather than 1n).
5. GENERAL TRANSFERABLE UTILITY GAMES AND
THE FORMATION OF COALITIONS
The only requirement we have imposed so far on the cooperative
environment is that of zero-monotonicity. Zero-monotonic environments
might still violate superadditivity. Therefore the (weighted) bidding
mechanism implements the (weighted) Shapley value even in some non-
superadditive settings. This result, however, is not entirely satisfactory since
the outcome while coinciding with the Shapley value might not be ``really''
efficient. The sum of payments would indeed equal v(N), yet v(N) might
not be the maximal payoff the players could obtain. Note that in non-
superadditive environments it might be possible for the players to obtain a
sum of payments that exceeds v(N) by splitting up into two or more coali-
tions.
One way to resolve this difficulty might be to consider the superadditive
cover of the environment. If we apply our mechanism to the superadditive
cover of the environment rather than to the original environment, the equi-
libria outcomes would coincide with the Shapley value of the superadditive
cover. A possible disadvantage of this approach is that a player (the
proposer) is able to collect rents from a coalition of which he or she is not
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coalition formed by other players.
14
One way to avoid the use of ``principals'' is to modify our mechanism.
The new generalized bidding mechanism would generate a coalition struc-
ture in which proposers would receive (when there is no rejection) just the
value of the coalition to which they belong. In this mechanism the players
would not only share the surplus but would also form coalitions in a
sequential way. We show that at any SPE, the coalitions formed will con-
stitute an efficient coalition structure and the final payments of the players
will coincide with the Shapley value of the superadditive cover of the
environment.
Before proceeding with the formal description of the generalized bidding
mechanism we introduce the following notation. The superadditive cover of
a cooperative game in characteristic form (N, v) is denoted by (N, V). The
value V(S), for SN, is defined by V(S)=Max? [s # ? &(s)|? is a parti-
tion of S].
We denote the Shapley value of player i in the SA cover of (N, v)b y
3i(N) and similarly for the values 3i(S) of subsets S of N. We know that:
3i(N)=
1
n
(V(N)&V(N"[i]))+
1
n
:
j{i
3i(N"[j ] ).
A partition ? such that V(N)=S # ? &(S) is called an efficient partition
for N.
The GBM is similar to the bidding mechanism. The only difference is
that in the GBM, the proposer, in addition to offering a vector of payments
to all the other players, also chooses a coalition he or she wants to form
and be a member of. Hence, an offer by the proposer consists of a
payments vector and a coalition. The offer is accepted if all the other
players agree. In case of acceptance the coalition is formed, the proposer
collects the value of that coalition, and the players outside the coalition
proceed to play the same game again among themselves. In the case of
rejection all the players other than the proposer play the same game again.
Formally, if there is only one player [i], he or she obtains the value of
the stand-alone coalition. Given the rules of the game when played by at
most n&1 players, the game for N=[1, ..., n] players proceeds as follows:
t=1: Each player i # N makes bids b
i
j in R for every j{i.
Player : is chosen as in the bidding mechanism and pays b
:
i to every
player i{:.
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14 See Pe  rez-Castrillo [21] and Pe  rez-Castrillo and Wettstein [22] for the use of principals
to realize cooperative outcomes.t=2: Player : chooses a coalition S: with : #S: and makes an offer
y
:
i in R to every player i{:.
t=3: The players other than :, sequentially, either accept or reject
the offer. If an agent rejects it, then the offer is rejected. Otherwise, the offer
is accepted.
If the offer is accepted, each player i{: receives y
:
i and player : receives
the value of the coalition S: minus the payments i{: y
:
i. After this,
players in N"S: proceed to play the GBM again among themselves.
(Therefore, final payment to a player i # S:"[:] is y
:
i+b
:
i , player :
receives &(S:)&i{: y
:
i &i{: b
:
i , and the final payment for a player
i# N"S: will be the sum of the bid b
:
i, the offer y
:
i, and the outcome of
the GBM where the players are N"S:.) On the other hand, if the offer is
rejected, all players other than : proceed to play the GBM where the set
of players is N"[:] and player : receives the value of his or her stand-
alone coalition.
Theorem 3. The generalized bidding mechanism implements the Shapley
value of the SA cover of the game (N, v).
Proof. The arguments, in part, are very similar to those used in
Theorem 1; thus we emphasize just the new features of this proof and
otherwise rely on the reasoning employed in Theorem 1.
It is easy to see that the theorem holds for k=1. We assume that it holds
for k=n&1 and then consider the following strategies:
At t=1, each player i, i # N, announces b
i
j=3j(N)&3j(N"[i]), for
every j{i.
At t=2, player i, i # N, if he or she is the proposer, chooses a coalition
Si such that Si # ArgmaxSN [v(S)+V(N"S)|i in S] and offers y
i
j=
3j(N"[i]) to every j # Si"[i] and y
i
j=3j(N"[i])&3j(N"Si) to every
j  Si .
At t=3, player i, i # N, if player j{i is the proposer and i # Sj, accepts
any offer greater than or equal to Qi(N"[j] ) and rejects it otherwise. If
player j{i is the proposer and i  Sj, player i accepts any offer greater than
or equal to 3i(N"[j] )&3j(N"Sj) and rejects it otherwise.
Following these strategies, the proposer selects a coalition S: that is part
of an efficient partition.
15 Also, the induction argument ensures that, in the
game that follows among the players in N"S: , player i  S: will obtain
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15 It can be easily shown that V(N)=MaxSN[v(S)+V(N"S)|: in S], for any player :
in N; hence, when the proposer chooses the best possible coalition to be a member of, he or
she is choosing a coalition that forms part of an efficient partition.3i(N"S:). It is then easy to see that the previous strategies yield 3i(N)t o
any player i.
To prove that the previous strategies constitute an SPE, note, first, that
the strategy at t=3 is a best response for any player different from the
proposer by the same argument we used in Theorem 1. At t=2, given the
rejection criteria used by the other players, if player i is the proposer, he
or she chooses a subset Si that maximizes:
&(Si)& :
j # Si"[i]
3j(N"[i])& :
j  Si
[3j(N"[i])&3j(N"Si)]
=&(Si)+V(N"Si)&V(N"[i]).
Therefore, the proposed strategy is optimal. Finally, an argument similar to
the one in the proof of Theorem 1 demonstrates the optimality of the
strategies at t=1.
To show that any SPE yields the Shapley value, we proceed by a series
of claims. We state the claims without proof, since they are similar to those
in Theorem 1. To simplify notation, we denote the ``effective offer'' to
player i{: in stage 2, when player : is the proposer by z
:
i , and define it
as z
:
i=y
:
i if i # S:"[:] and z
:
i=y
:
i+3i(N"S:)i fi  S: . By the induc-
tion argument, the effective offer is the total payment (without taking into
account the bid already received) that a player will receive (at equilibrium)
if the offer is accepted.
Claim (a). In any SPE, at t=3, any player j{: accepts the offer if z
:
j
is strictly greater than 3i(N"[:]) for every player i{:. Moreover, if
z
:
i<3i(N"[:]) for at least some i{:, then the offer is rejected.
Claim (b). If the coalition [:] is not part of any efficient partition,
then in any SPE of the game that starts at t=2, : will choose a coalition
S: that is part of an efficient partition. Furthermore, player : will announce
offers such that z
:
i=3i(N"[:]) for any player i{:. Finally, at t=3, every
player i{: accepts any offer such that z
:
i3i(N"[:]).
If the coalition [:] is part of any efficient partition, there exist other
equilibria in addition to the previous ones. Any set of strategies where, at
t=2, the proposer makes offers such that z
:
j 3j(N"[:]) to a particular
player j{: and, at t=3, the player j rejects any effective offer less than or
equal to 3j(N"[:]), also constitute an SPE.
In all the SPE of this subgame, the payoffs (taking into account the con-
tinuation of the game after S: has been formed) to players : and i{: are
V(N)&V(N"[:])& j{: b
:
j and 3i(N"[:])+b
:
i, respectively.
(Notice that following both types of strategies an efficient partition is
formed.)
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i=0 for all i in N.
Claim (d). In any SPE, each player's payoff is the same regardless of
who is chosen as the proposer.
Claim (e). In any SPE, the final payment received by each of the
players coincides with that player's Shapley value in the SA cover. Q.E.D.
Theorem 3 shows that when facing environments where forming the
grand coalition might not be efficient, it is possible to employ a generalized
version of our original bidding mechanism that allows an efficient partition
to be formed and the surplus to be shared in a ``reasonable'' way. If the
game is superadditive, the generalized version yields the same outcome as
the bidding mechanism. It is, however, important to notice that, if the
game is not superadditive but the grand coalition is efficient, this coalition
is formed under both mechanisms although the sharing of the surplus will
be different. The reason is that the Shapley value of the superadditive cover
usually does not coincide with the Shapley value of the game if the game
is not superadditive.
Our GBM provides support for the use of the Shapley value of the SA
cover as the generalization of the Shapley value for games in which it is
efficient to form coalition structures which are different from the grand
coalition. The GBM implements the Shapley value of the SA cover by
simultaneously providing a bidding and coalition formation game. To the
best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that supports this solution
concept. Aumann and Dre  ze [1] study games with a (given) coalition
structure and define a value that assigns to each player his or her Shapley
value in the coalition he or she belongs to. Under this concept, the payoff
to any player does not depend upon that player's contribution to coalitions
other than his or her coalition. The Shapley value of the superadditive
cover takes into account not only the contribution of a player to the coali-
tion he or she belongs to in an efficient structure, but also his or her poten-
tial contribution to any other coalition.
16
6. CONCLUSION
The object of this paper was to construct a simple noncooperative
mechanism to realize a sharing of the surplus in a cooperative environment.
The mechanism we use basically consists of two distinct stages of play:
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16 Owen [20] and Hart and Kurz [10] also propose a coalition structure value to every
game and every coalition structure. However, in their approach, the coalition structure serves
only as a bargaining tool to increase the payoff of the members of the coalitions. At the end,
all the players join the grand coalition.a bidding stage, at the end of which a winner is determined, followed by a
proposal stage where the winner offers a sharing of the surplus. In the case
where the proposal is rejected, the same game is played again by the
players except for the proposer. We show that the payoff outcome of the
subgame perfect equilibria of this game always coincides with the Shapley
value of the game. Moreover, the strategies played by the players at equi-
librium are simple and natural. We also showed that a natural modification
of the mechanism implements the weighted Shapley value. Finally, we have
introduced a simple generalization of the bidding mechanism that handles
situations where the grand coalition might not be efficient. By playing the
game, the players form, at equilibrium, an efficient coalition structure and
share the surplus according to the Shapley value of the superadditive cover
of the environment.
These mechanisms provide strong support for applying the Shapley value
to situations where cooperation is needed to obtain an efficient outcome. It
might also be used for a variety of cost allocation, revenue sharing, or
partnership dissolution problems.
The general approach taken in this paper may yield ways to provide
noncooperative foundations for other cooperative solution concepts for
transferable utility games or for cost-sharing methods. However, the exten-
sion of our approach to nontransferable utility games is problematic. There
exist several extensions of the Shapley value to nontransferable utility
games proposed by Harsanyi [9], Shapley [26], and Maschler and Owen
[16, 17]. Dagan and Serrano [3] have shown that randomness is a
necessary component in a mechanism designed to implement any of these
extensions. Since the element of randomness in our mechanism (i.e., the tie-
breaking rule) is inconsequential to proving our results, it seems that the
approach taken in this paper would fail to implement the existing exten-
sions of the Shapley value.
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